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For people with Bipolar Affective Disorder, a self-binding (advance) directive (SBD), by which they commit
themselves to treatment during future episodes of mania, even if unwilling, can seem the most rational way to
deal with an imperfect predicament. Knowing that mania will almost certainly cause enormous damage to
themselves, their preferred solution may well be to allow trusted others to enforce treatment and constraint,
traumatic though this may be. No adequate provision exists for drafting a truly effective SBD and efforts to
establish such provision are hampered by very valid, but also paralysing ethical, clinical and legal concerns.
Effectively, the autonomy and rights of people with bipolar are being ‘protected’ through being denied an
opportunity to protect themselves. From a standpoint ﬁrmly rooted in the clinical context and experience of
mania, this article argues that an SBD, based on a patient-centred evaluation of capacity to make treatment
decisions (DMC-T) and grounded within the clinician–patient relationship, could represent a legitimate and
ethically coherent form of self-determination. After setting out background information on ﬂuctuating capacity,
mania and advance directives, this article proposes a framework for constructing such an SBD, and considers
common objections, possible solutions and suggestions for future research.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction: the dilemma — the case of P
P is a 48 year old man who used to work as an electrician and has a
diagnosis of Bipolar Affective Disorder. Since early adulthood he has
experienced manic episodes, lasting a few months each, as well as one
severe depressive episode, duringwhich he attempted suicide by trying
to jump off a bridge. He has now had approximately twenty hospital
admissions.Whenwell he tries his best to get onwith his life, maintain-
ing close contact with two grown up children and pursuing an interest
in music. Both P and those who know him regard him as entirely well
and ‘himself’ when in remission, but as a “different person” when ill/
manic, whose behaviour is utterly uncharacteristic and associated
with major harms to his relationships, self-esteem, property and affairs.
During one episode, for example, his ﬂatwas stripped of all property in-
cluding his bed and his car was taken.
P is intelligent and, when well, has very good insight into his condi-
tion and its consequences. He is persuaded that medication has helped
to treat manic episodes, but not that adherence to medication is helpful
in preventing further episodes. Although his family recognise the early
symptoms of an episode and often report these to his team, P is ordinar-
ily resistant to treatment at these points and presents as in control of
potential harms. Typically, he is considered below the threshold for
compulsory treatment. This does occur, but is delayed until the situation
has deteriorated signiﬁcantly: “instead of them coming and getting me
at the beginning, they'll leave me on the street, to get worse and worse,
and worse and worse.” In P's retrospective view, compulsory treatment
has started too late.
P is desperate to stop this happening. He can clearly identify key
prodromal indicators and, for the last three years he has repeated
a wish for early intervention with compulsory treatment under
Section 3 of England'sMental Health Act (1983)1, as soon as the episode
is beginning. P has repeated past experience of compulsory treatment.
He says “I hate Section 3 anyway” and recognises that his proposed
solution will be harrowing. Nevertheless, he maintains:
When becoming unwell treatment at home is not suitable for me. I
need to be admitted to hospital under compulsory treatment, even
if I seem to still have some control — otherwise I am likely to get
overconﬁdent and start getting involved with people and activities
that disrupt my life.
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For P this would be away of using his retrospective knowledge of his
illness, when he has capacity, to minimise its enormous personal cost
and take back control over his life.
P is attempting to use his surrounding social, clinical and legal frame-
work to enable a form of self-determination known as a self-binding
(advance) directive (SBD) or Ulysses Contract, in order to take control
over his illness and limit the damage it causes. He stipulates early warn-
ing signs that should both be understood to indicate the need for an
assessment for compulsory detention and treatment, and should inform
the judgement which is made. These include fast speech, irritability, and
grandiosity, along with behaviours like “bible-bashing,” going travelling
and talking about philosophical questions. His stipulations are based on
extensive past experience.
At present, however, the UK and nearly all other jurisdictions have
no established clinical or legal provision to support this form of self-
determination, even though both P and his clinicians can see that pre-
binding to accepting treatment before major deterioration ensued
could avert enormous damage. Like others with his condition, he faces
a future of knowing that further episodes will most likely come, but
being powerless to protect himself from their devastating effects.
Psychiatric advance directives (PADS) are the focus of increasing
debate, being mooted as a mechanism to enhance self-determination
within psychiatry, and discussion has intensiﬁed in the wake of the
UN's Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2008)
(CRPD). However, though welcomed at a theoretical level, this is not
reﬂected in practice and, even where provision exists, their use is
uncommon (Backlar, 1998; Gallagher, 1998; Jeste & Saks, 2006, p. 624;
Sarin, 2012; Srebnik & Kim, 2006; Swanson et al., 2003; Varekamp,
2004). A frequently cited aim of PADs in general is to reduce the
need for coercion through, for example, improving crisis manage-
ment recommendations based on patients' past experiences and pref-
erences (Henderson et al., 2004; Khazaal, Chatton, Pasandin, Zullino, &
Preisig, 2009; Swanson et al., 2008; Thornicroft et al., 2013). By contrast,
a primary outcome of SBDs is to enable the individual to request intro-
duction of coercive interventions in the earlier stages of illness, in order
to prevent themselves from engaging in damaging and risky behaviour
as they deteriorate (Gremmen,Widdershoven, Beekman, Zuijderhoudt,
& Sevenhuijsen, 2008). Within the context of broad concerns about
psychiatric coercion and current interpretations of the CRPD, which
reject entirely judgements of incapacity and use of coercion (2014),
this central coercive aspect of SBDs might seem problematic. Neverthe-
less, we contend that they could represent an ethically coherent means
of enhancing self-determination which is consistent with the broadly
worded aims of enablement and empowerment espoused within the
CRPD itself.
We propose a form of SBD based on decision-making capacity for
treatment (DMC-T) and argue that SBDs could have the potential to
allow bipolar patients increased control and damage limitation. We
will examine: the ‘ﬂuctuating capacity’ characteristic of severe Bipolar
Affective Disorder; the limitations of existing legal types of advance
directives in this context; how to address associated rights-based and
clinical difﬁculties. Unlike many discussions surrounding advance
decision-making, which stem from an ethical and legal perspective,
our starting-point is ﬁrmly rooted in the clinical context.
There is no perfect solution for the management of manic episodes,
which, all too often, bring enormous personal damage and eventual
deprivation of liberty — in the words of Gremmen et al. “coercion and
care do not easily go together (2008).” SBDs will always involve a pro-
cess of cost/beneﬁt analysis, withmajor concerns on both sides. The no-
tion of voluntarily committing one's conscious and often very lucid self
to being treated involuntarily can seem shocking, especially to those
unacquainted with the realities of living with mania. Even to clinicians,
whose experience of patients is often dominated by times of crisis, it can
seem inconceivable that a patient when well will have both the desire
and ability to engage in a self-binding process. However, when well,
those attempting to navigate the mineﬁeld of life with bipolar disorder
are left to struggle with both the damage from previous episodes and
their fears for what future episodes might bring. An SBD, for those who
wish to draft one, may well be the best available option, despite its costs
(Gallagher, 1998). For the sake of individuals such as P, we argue that
the legal and clinical community has a strongmoral obligation to consider
the feasibility of allowing the type of provision P requests (Gevers, 2002;
Rosenson&Kasten, 1991; Sheetz, 2006;Winston,Winston, Appelbaum,&
Rhoden, 1982).
2. Background
2.1. What do we mean by “ﬂuctuating capacity” in bipolar disorder?
The term ‘ﬂuctuating capacity’ is not recognised in statute, but has
been used in secondary legislation, such as the Mental Capacity Act
Code of Practice (Department of Constitutional Affairs, 2007) and case
law2. It is associated with changes in DMC-T characteristic of the onset
and recovery from episodes of a psychiatric disorder such as mania
within bipolar disorder. A typical time course showing change in symp-
toms and change in DMC-T is shown in Fig. 1.
Generally, DMC-T is lost as an episode worsens and then returns
with recovery. Episodes occur on a cyclical basis, with substantial
periods of remission and full capacity in between. Given that onset
and recovery are usually gradual, it can be difﬁcult to determine the
exact moment at which DMC-T is judged lost or regained.
Loss of DMC-T is extremely common in mania, probably more so
than for any other psychiatric condition, and is often regained in about
a month (Owen et al., 2011). Several studies have concluded that the
majority of manic inpatients are lacking in DMC-T (Beckett & Chaplin,
2006; Cairns et al., 2005a; Owen et al., 2008). The most recent of these,
which involved clinical interviews and structured DMC-T assessment,
reported that 97% of those admitted with mania to a psychiatric ward,
whether formally or informally, had impaired DMC-T (Owen et al.,
2008). Importantly, loss of DMC-T in mania associates strongly with
two characteristics. These are loss of insight – a clinical construct
depicting self-awareness of mental state change and illness (Owen
et al., 2009); and loss of appreciation – a legal construct depicting ability
to apply information abstractly understood to oneself. By contrast, within
general medical hospital patients, it is most usually cognitive abilities
which are affected (Owen et al., 2013). Thus, despite concerns which
are frequently raised (Breden & Vollmann, 2004; Gallagher, 1998; Tan
& Hope, 2008; Weller, 2013, pp. 8–9), it should not be assumed: that
determining the lack of DMC-T in psychiatry is generally problematic;
that evidence of good cognitive skills within mania is indicative of
DMC-T; or, that capacity assessment has an exclusively cognitive bias,
rendering it unable to accommodate the type of impairments associated
withmania or other affective disorders. Capacity assessment itself should
take into account not simply narrow concepts of reasoning, but all the
decision-making abilities recognised by law (Dunn et al., 2006; Kim,
2009; Lepping, 2011).
Fluctuating capacity is sometimes conﬂated with ﬂuctuations in
mental state and preference, which can occur during states such as
mania. Mania is not a static mental state and an individual's presenta-
tion, preferences and opinions may change within it. Sometimes, these
changes may appear to involve coherent patterns of reasoning and
increased insight. Nevertheless, even if this makes the interpretation
challenging, these “ﬂuctuations” of mental state do not indicate the
types of deep changes which occur as the manic episode begins or
comes to its end.
Extremely important here is also the differentiation between DMC-T
and the broader notion of legal capacity. There are multiple deﬁnitions
of legal capacity. However, we are using the term “legal capacity” to
denote an individual's capacity to hold rights on an equal basis with
2 R v C [2009] UKHL 42.
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others and to be, as it were, visible to human rights law. We will argue
below that this essential right does not ﬂuctuate and must be both
distinct from and unaffected by formal judgement of the lack of DMC-T.
2.2. Mania — key characteristics
Bipolar disorder, formerly known as manic depression, is a cross-
cultural disorder, with high heritability (Bienvenu, Davydow, & Kendler,
2011; McGufﬁn et al., 2003). It is associated with high IQ early in life
(MacCabe et al., 2010) and with addiction and suicide throughout life
(Merikangas et al., 2008; Osby, Brandt, Correia, Ekbom, & Sparén, 2001).
Although the condition typically includes both manic and depressive
stages, we are focusing on mania, the stage most closely associated with
ﬂuctuating capacity. Manic episodes follow a cyclical pattern and the
shift into mania is usually a gradual process of escalation. Very often, an
individual experiencing mania will lack insight that they are unwell and
be unaware of the risks of their behaviour. This, for example, is how P
puts it:
you're just unwell at the time. Imean, I know the difference between
being well and being unwell, but when you're under [mania] you
don't know the difference…because everything seems so real you
think that you are well and that everybody else is making a wrong
diagnosis.
Mania itself can include a full range of symptoms found in other
mental disorders and is usually characterised by a combination of
relentless energy, elation and lack of both inhibition and doubt. P says:
before you go into hospital you're high and you're putting yourself at
risk. You're putting yourself at risk because you're letting Tom, Dick
andHarry into your house,whoare robbing all your possessions, and
I'm going onto the frontline and stuff like that, and challenging crack
dealers, and stuff like that. And I putmyself at risk by doing that. And
even though you don't feel it at the time, that's what you're actually
doing.
Decreased need for sleep is accompanied by a constant need for stim-
ulation, which can manifest itself in extremes of spending, socialising,
sexual activity and substance abuse.
While the subjective experience of mania is frequently one of
extraordinary abilities and enlightenment, it is often accompanied by
paranoia or other delusions, anger, agitation and claustrophobia. While
P may believe himself to be an inspired scientist, who has read every
bookwritten in the past, present or future, he can also believe that hospi-
tal are monitoring him through a device in his head. For some, it can
manifest itself as, or become, ‘mixed’ or ‘dysphoric’mania, often regarded
as the most dangerous of all disordered mental states in terms of suicide
risk, with the energy, disinhibition and impulsivity of mania combined
with the most negative and self-destructive aspects of depression. In her
autobiographical account of living with bipolar disorder, the US psychia-
trist Kay Jamison describes themoments leading up to a suicide attempt:
I can't think. I can't calm this murderous cauldron, my grand ideas of
anhour ago seem absurd and pathetic,my life is in ruins and –worse
still – ruinous; my body is uninhabitable. It is raging and weeping
and full of destruction and wild energy gone amok. In the mirror I
see a creature I don't know but must live and share my mind with.
I understand why Jekyll killed himself before Hyde had taken over
completely. I took a massive overdose of lithium with no regrets
(1995, p. 115).
Jamison was discovered and survived. She has now written an SBD
type agreement, requesting hospitalisation and treatment with ECT,
even if unwilling, should such a situation recur (1995, p. 113).
Many people with bipolar can manage to ﬁnd an effective and
acceptable maintenance strategy over time, which can keep the condi-
tion under control using medication and other forms of lifestyle man-
agement. However, there are also many, like P, for whom a successful
and realistic long-term strategy cannot be found (Berghmans & van
der Zanden, 2012). Treatments which work at certain times of life or
certain stages of the illness may be less successful long-term, or unfea-
sible due to side-effects. Episodes can be sparked by physical or mental
stresses which are common in the course of ordinary life, such as sleep
loss or disturbance, illness, pregnancy, overwork, excessive stress or
alcohol and substance use. Without a perfect means of control, any of
these factors can act as triggers for mania, leaving those with bipolar
to live with a constant risk of future manic episodes and their collateral
damage.
2.3. Advanced decision making — current law and practice
Advance decision-making can be thought of a codiﬁcation of what
Ronald Dworkin called "precedent autonomy" (1990, p. 226). Precedent
autonomy is the idea that an individual's preferences when autono-
mous trump their preferences when lacking autonomy and that this
can extend self-determination to incapacity3.
Fig. 1. Fluctuating capacity and remission in mania*. *Excludes severe depressive episodes.
3 In an example given by Dworkin, a Jehovah's witness' autonomous advance of blood
products must be followed when, later, in a deranged mental state, they pleaded for a
blood transfusion (p227).
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At present, there are threemainmodels of advance decisionmaking,
recognised to varying degrees within legislation. The UK and many
other jurisdictions recognise some type of advanced refusal of treat-
ment, such as the Advanced Decision to Refuse Treatment (ADRT)with-
in England'sMental Capacity Act (2005) (MCA). These can only bemade
when DMC-T is present and are designed to apply when DMC-T is
absent, although they are subject to court approval and can be overturned
by mental health legislation. They are, however, limited to treatment
refusals and therefore have limited relevance for SBDs in a case such
as P's.
An individual can also make an advance statement of wishes
concerning treatment and management of future psychiatric episodes.
Often termed ‘living wills’ or ‘instruction directives’ (Gallagher, 1998;
Gevers, 2002), this model of advance decision-making comes closer to
P's suggestions. Nevertheless, it is essentially non-binding and the
legal informality would not authorise the compulsory treatment P has
in mind. Instruction directives are widely supported, but there are
implementation problems and the empirical evidence for effectiveness
is not currently compelling (Campbell & Kisely, 2009; Fagerlin &
Schneider, 2004; Sheetz, 2006; Thornicroft et al., 2013).
Finally, there are provisions, in many jurisdictions, for an individual
with DMC to hand over decision-making to a proxy (e.g. a family mem-
ber) at a time DMC is lost. In theMCA this is the Lasting Power of Attor-
ney (LPA). While these are more often used for decisions concerning
property and affairs, LPAs may also be constructed for healthcare deci-
sions, although they are essentially untested in relation to psychiatric
disorders such as bipolar. When DMC-T is lost a healthcare professional
must, in effect, seek treatment permissions from the LPA in place of their
patient. Where treatment involves coercion or deprivation of liberty
mental health laws prevail which make no formal use of these proxy
decision-making structures.
Existing legislation surrounding advance decision making is not a
good ﬁt for bipolar. In general, the basic forms have been constructed
to manage end of life situations and disorders such as Alzheimer's
Disease or brain injury where ﬂuctuating capacity is not characteristic
(Halpern & Szmukler, 1997). Furthermore, the notion of advance deci-
sionmaking is typically absent from primary mental health legislation.4
SBDs in psychiatry, which invoke precedent autonomy to authorise
precommitment to compulsory treatment, were ﬁrst discussed in the
early 80s. Although the idea has been discussed repeatedly and with
considerable enthusiasm by both libertarian and conservative voices
(Gallagher, 1998, pp. 782–3), this has then been stiﬂed by the numerous
rights-based and practical concerns which have emerged within ensu-
ing debates (Dresser, 1982; Miller, 1998). The Netherlands is the only
European jurisdiction where this form of precedent autonomy is
codiﬁed.5 Since 2008, the Dutch Psychiatric Hospital (Compulsory
admissions) Act – “Wet Bopz” Act – permits a non-capacity based SBD
(where implementation does not depend on a judgement of loss of
DMC-T) to authorise compulsory treatment if various procedural safe-
guards are satisﬁed. There has been no major empirical research into
SBDs and, in the Netherlands, their usage has been extremely limited
and generally impracticable, due to the extent and complexity of the sur-
rounding legislative safeguards (Berghmans & van der Zanden, 2012).
Given that rights-based concerns remain signiﬁcant arguments against
SBDs, it is interesting to note that their introduction in the Netherlands
in 2008 stemmed from service-user demand to give patients more
inﬂuence over treatment, in response to what were perceived as the
limitations of 1994 liberal law reforms. Service-user organisations
wished to retain the right to secure compulsory treatment at a lower
threshold than the immediate risk-based criteria for commitment dictat-
ed (Berghmans & van der Zanden, 2012; Varekamp, 2004).
3. Self-binding in bipolar
SBDs are often known as Ulysses Contracts. In Book 12 of Homer's
Odyssey, Odysseus (Ulysses) tells his crew to bind him to the mast of
his ship, so that he can experience the irresistible song of the Sirens
without being drawn to self-destruction by abandoning his mission
and wasting away on their island, bewitched by the sublime pleasure
and enlightenment they offer. Like Odysseus, individuals like P, who
experiencemania, can anticipate that they will be unable, even through
rational persuasion, to prevent themselves from damaging behaviour at
some future point and that they will be lacking capacity to make treat-
ment decisions. Despite difﬁculties, SBDs could have the potential to
help patients like P to exert control over this situation (Sarin, 2012).
3.1. How would an SBD work?
In order for it to be both practicable and ethically viable, our proposed
model of SBD is entirely predicated on the notion of DMC-T and lays out a
framework in which SBDs inform and help to determine DMC-T assess-
ment, at the same time as being entirely dependent upon the outcomes
of such assessment for the enforceability of the interventionswhich they
request.
SBDs have generally been seen as a sub-type of “instruction” PAD,
which request the use of compulsory treatment at an earlier stage of
the illness than would conventionally be judged as eligible for compul-
sory treatment (Gevers, 2002; Halpern & Szmukler, 1997; Sheetz, 2006;
Varekamp, 2004). This has led to a widespread assumption that such
directives are ‘competence insensitive’ and could enable the use of com-
pulsory treatmentwhile an individual still has ‘competence’ or capacity.
Gallagher, for example, states that ‘the sine quanon of a Ulysses clause is
its attempt to provide for the irrevocability of an advance directive even
during a time when the declarant is technically competent’ (Gallagher,
1998). This assumption has, understandably, fuelled many of the stron-
gest concerns about such measures (Bielby, 2014; Davis, 2008; Dresser,
1982; Gallagher, 1998; Radden, 1994; Walker, 2012).
However, for an SBD is to be ethically viable, it is critical that it does
not violate the principle that those with capacity to make autonomous
decisions must be allowed to do so freely and that anyone with DMC-T
must be permitted to revoke or revise such an agreement (Atkinson,
Garner, & Gilmour, 2004; Berghmans & van der Zanden, 2012;
Gremmen et al., 2008; Halpern & Szmukler, 1997; Sheetz, 2006;
Widdershoven & Berghmans, 2007). Accordingly, our suggested
model of SBD does not simply request particular treatments when
particular behaviours are witnessed, but takes these behaviours to
be key indicators that DMC-T may have been lost and requires
assessment. Unlike other advance directives, which are only invoked
after a patient has already been judged to be lacking in DMC-T, SBDs
would thereby have an informing role in the assessment of capacity,
as well as directing any compulsory treatment once capacity is
judged to be lost.
In order towork effectively, an SBDwould involve the following type
of process:
1) Assessment that the individual is eligible, insofar as: a) they current-
ly have capacity to evaluate their future healthcare needs in the light
of relevant information and experience; b) they are making a free
and informed choice, without any pressure or coercion; c) they are
creating a directive for treatment recommended by an appropriate
clinician, based on clear past experience of prior episodes, conse-
quences and treatment (Gevers, 2002; Gremmen et al., 2008).
4 For example, in England andWales it is absent from theMental Health Act (1983) and
therefore has no statutory force although it is present in the Code of Practice for this Act
(secondary legislation).
5 As far aswe are aware the only state inNorthAmerica that provides a SBD isWashington
State. In 2003Washington made a provision for advance directives consenting to treatment
and waiving the right to refuse treatment based on decision-making capacity (Revised Code
of WashingtonTitle 71 —MENTAL ILLNESS 71.32, 2013). Very little is written about imple-
mentation. We note that the cognitive understanding of capacity within Washington law
(RCW 11.88.010 (1) (e)) is a poor ﬁt for mania and that legal opinion on the Washington
SBD appears divided (Anderson, 2003; Sheetz, 2006).
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2) The individual identiﬁes a typical set of behaviours which can be
taken as ﬁrm indicators of an incipient and escalating episode of
mania with associated harms. They might stipulate further condi-
tions, such as how many of these behaviours must be witnessed
before the directive is invoked.
3) The SBD requests that, if they begin to manifest such behaviours,
the following process should be followed: a) the behaviours are
recognised by the clinical team as likely indicators of an incipient
episode and they should be offered the treatment which the clini-
cian and the SBD approves6; b) if they refuse treatment, or act in
such a way that that treatment is not happening, they should be
immediately assessed for the lack of DMC-T; c) assessors must use
the behaviours and information given in the SBD to determine
whether they consider the individual to be lacking in DMC-T; d) if
the individual is found to be lacking in DMC-T on this basis, they
should be subject to compulsory detention and treatment in line
with recommendations which have been clinically approved on the
SBD. This line should be followed unless new clinical information
has come to light that justiﬁes change in the clinical recommenda-
tion. The compulsory treatment would be overseen by Mental
Health Act tribunals or courts in the usual way and part of the
responsibility of the tribunal or court would be to ensure that the
SBD is being respected.
4) The SBD could also include some indication of time needed for
compulsory treatment, preferred treatment options were ﬁrst-
line treatments to fail, behavioural indicators which should lead
to termination of compulsory treatment and indicators for regaining
DMC-T. These components should inﬂuence the responsible clini-
cian or the tribunal/court without being binding. (Gevers, 2002).
5) As a further point, in order for the individual to have some guar-
antee that the SBD will be taken into account, we would recom-
mend that there must be some provision for formal recognition
of such documents and accountability, if they are either not
invoked or not followed.
6) If, and only if, the individual has DMC-T, they are free to revoke or
revise their SBD at any time (Berghmans & van der Zanden, 2012;
Gevers, 2002).
An SBDwould also include certain factors whichmight otherwise go
in instructional directives, such as non-treatment related aspects of care
and management of affairs while ill and desired involvement of family
members and/or carers. It would thus play a dual role of both guarantee-
ing treatment, but also inﬂuencing care decisions, both aspects of which
have been highlighted as important by patient discussions of such inter-
ventions (Varekamp, 2004).
Effectively, an SBDwould lower the parameters atwhich to consider
introducing coercive interventions and make the threshold for deter-
mining loss of DMC-Tmore tailored to bipolar, but also farmore depen-
dent on the individual's own views about how their conditionmanifests
and its probable consequences. Current frameworks of assessment are
based too heavily on a decontextualized assessment of behaviours and
views regarding treatment at that time. By contrast, SBDs would both
require and facilitate a framework of assessment and treatment which
accommodates an appraisal of the individual's behaviours, values and
beliefs in the broader context of their history and which can allow
their own consideration of best interests and potential harms to have
a determinative role in their treatment. “Lack of attention to the
patient's underlying values and beliefs” has been identiﬁed as a short-
coming of advance directives in general, with supplementation with a
type of “values-history” proposed as a solution (Berghmans & van der
Zanden, 2012).
In broad terms, this is similar to the Dutch SBD model. However,
rather than being integrated into an existing capacity or mental health
assessment, the Dutch SBDs are subject to distinct and complex legisla-
tion, requiring extensive legal and clinical involvement for both con-
struction and enforcement. As mentioned above, this has made them
unfeasible. Despite reforms, take-up is extremely small and may even
be decreasing (Berghmans & van der Zanden, 2012). Moreover, al-
though proponents recognise the necessity of lack of DMC-T for the
SBD (Berghmans & van der Zanden, 2012; Gremmen et al., 2008;
Widdershoven & Berghmans, 2007), and the law itself stipulates that
the patient must have DMC-T when writing the SBD (Berghmans &
van der Zanden, 2012), the Dutch model appears to base the decision
to use involuntary treatment simply on the subsequent presence of
prodromal behaviours, rather than a judgement of loss of DMC-T. In
an example given by Berghmans and van der Zanden an SBD authorised
compulsory detention and treatment for 6 weeks, for a woman with
bipolar if at least two out of eight prodromal indicators occur. These
included unusual expenditures, inviting people for dinner and buying
presents, declining self-care (e.g. smell of urine) and “basic rejecting
attitude”. However, without subsequent capacity assessment, a signiﬁ-
cant overlap with normal behavioural variation leaves the Dutch SBD
open, not only to the problems of over-juridiﬁcation or complications,
but to ambiguity and the concomitant rights-based concerns about
whether the person subject to involuntary treatment is, in fact, really
lacking in the ability to decide treatment for themselves.
3.2. Potential advantages of an SBD?
For the individual and those around them, the clearest advantage and
primary motivation for an SBD would be damage limitation (Atkinson
et al., 2004; Berghmans & van der Zanden, 2012; Dresser, 1982;
Gallagher, 1998; Gremmen et al., 2008; Sheetz, 2006; Varekamp, 2004;
Widdershoven & Berghmans, 2007). P, for example, wants to know that
he can protect himself from the personal damage and loss of property
which result from his episodes of mania. This would bring with it, not
only signiﬁcant material advantages, but a sense of control over ill-
ness and life. More expeditious treatment may result in shorter,
less severe or more easily treatable episodes. It is even possible
that less severe attacks might, ultimately, lead to greater overall
stability and improved health outcomes. Given that the SBD also
identiﬁes treatments and management deemed most desirable and
acceptable to the patient, while also building trust, it might be the
case that SBDs will lessen the level of perceived or actual coercion
within treatment (Gremmen et al., 2008; Varekamp, 2004). Equally,
the patient, may be able, especially in the earlier stages of an episode,
to comprehend the need to accept treatment based on the existence
of the SBD, even if the SBD is never formally invoked, so that use of
formal compulsion is avoided.
Drafting an SBD would create an opportunity for detailed reﬂection
and engagement between the patient and their clinical team. Both
may feel that it enables the patient to take greater responsibility for
their care, while also increasing levels of trust and awareness between
them, with increased communication and trust frequently identiﬁed as
a major beneﬁt of both SBDs and PADs in general (Halpern & Szmukler,
1997; Sheetz, 2006; Swanson et al., 2003; Varekamp, 2004; Weller,
2013). The wider beneﬁts which an increased sense of engagement,
responsibility and regained control could bring to the patient should
not be underestimated.
A condition like bipolar, where capacity can ﬂuctuate, where a
person can truly gain experience of the difference between their
preferences when manic and when not, and where they can be in
a position to evaluate that difference, seems eminently suited to
precedent autonomy. SBDs could be one way towards making treat-
ment for severe psychiatric illness more harmonious with the broad
aspirations of the CRPD.
6 These transition points can be subtle and offers of treatmentmay be acceptedwithout
overt requests for them. P says about his transitions “I often know subconsciously when I
amunwell, even if I don't admit it— so if I amasking for appointments to see someone that
probably means I need to be seen and given some extra support”.
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4. Potential difﬁculties of SBD and how to address them?
Difﬁculties surrounding SBDs can be divided into two sets of
concerns: ethical ‘rights-based’ and clinical. In this section we set out
some of the most signiﬁcant of these difﬁculties and offer suggestions
for moving towards some workable solutions. As we stated initially,
we are far from suggesting that SBDs represent either a perfect or uni-
versally appropriate solution for those affected by mania. Neither
human rights nor clinical realities are straightforward, and this is espe-
cially the case in a scenario such as P's, enmeshed as it is in a set of often
conﬂicting priorities: his own desire to protect himself; his resistance to
treatment when manic and the subjective distress brought by enforced
treatment; the moral obligation to safeguard his rights to liberty and
autonomy; the practical limitations of the clinical situation. Neverthe-
less, the absence of a perfect or infallible solution in this context should
not deter us from attempting to ﬁnd the answer which is, on balance,
the most ethically and practically coherent for the individual them-
selves. Indeed, we think that cases such as P's should stimulate the
development of human rights and clinical thinking.
As well as ethical and clinical concerns, there are, of course, the
practical questions of statutory drafting and clinical implementation.
Our aimhere, however, is amore preliminary and general consideration
of how an acceptable SBD might be constructed, without making any
precise legislative suggestions.
4.1. Ethical “rights-based” questions
4.1.1. Writing the SBD — free and informed consent
The main worries surrounding informed consent are how to ensure
that the individual has capacity for informed and autonomous decision-
making when drawing up an SBD and to ensure that the individual has
made a truly free choice to write an SBD, without feeling pressurised or
coerced in any way.
Informed consent depends upon DMC-T and we, like others, regard
this as a prerequisite for drafting an SBD. The nature of ﬂuctuating
capacity in a condition such as mania means that, in theory, estab-
lishing a period of DMC-T to construct the SBD during remission
should not be problematic. SBDs rely on the premise that the patient
fully recovers DMC-T between episodes, which enables proper reﬂec-
tion and decision-making. Bipolar is a condition which has shown to
be associated with full recovery of DMC-T (Owen et al., 2011). As the
case of P clearly shows, there seems no reason to see insufﬁcient capac-
ity as a probable stumbling block. Equally, SBDs must also fulﬁl the
criteria for informed consent by ensuring that patients with capacity
understand they are free to revoke or revise.
It is also possible that worries about the lack of capacity or general
ability to engage in the necessary considerations stem from views that
psychiatric patients, even when well, are more vulnerable than others
or that their judgement is in some way always compromised (Sarin,
2012; Sheetz, 2006). This can give rise to a type of ethical protectionism,
which ends up limiting patients' choices, through false assumptions
about their capabilities for decision-making. So, even Dutch proponents
of SBDs reﬂect on the worry: “what are acceptable ways of discussing a
SBDwith a mentally ill patient, given their vulnerability? (2012)”. Once
again, if we consider P, we see a deeply intelligentman ready to face the
harsh realities of his condition and suggestwhatwill be, for him, a tough
but coherent solution — a very different picture of an individual from
the psychological and intellectual fragility often ascribed to those with
mental disorders.
Informed consent for treatment requires that a patient has sufﬁcient
information about the process to which they are consenting. Here,
consent to an SBD may be seen as more ‘informed’ than many other
treatment decisions because it is based on the patient's own prior expe-
rience of both the condition and the treatment (Cuca, 1993; Gevers,
2002). Unlike advanced refusals and instructional directives, which
can be constructed independently of the clinician–patient relationship,
SBDs depend upon involvement with a clinician who has a full under-
standing of the individual case history and is able to make appropriate
recommendations.
Althoughwe present this potential expansion of the clinical relation-
ship as a positive (Gevers, 2002), one of themost pervasive and strongest
concerns surrounding SBDs is the question of how to ensure that consent
is given voluntarily, without pressure or coercion from either clinicians
or carers (Atkinson et al., 2004; Berghmans & van der Zanden, 2012;
Cuca, 1993; Dresser, 1982; Gevers, 2002; Varekamp, 2004). Clearly, the
introduction of SBDs would need a provision to ensure that no type of
undue inﬂuence is exerted, as has been established within the Dutch
SBD laws. However, the solution is not simply to shift power away
from the clinical relationship.
It is often argued that even collaboration between patient and team
takes place within the power-structure of a “coercion context”:
The very possibility that coercive measures can be used will be
part of the situational context in cases in which staff and pa-
tients differ in their opinions about what is the best course of
treatment to undertake. Hence, there is a subtle interrelation-
ship between coercion and compliance in all realms of psychiat-
ric care (Sjöström, 2006).
Nevertheless, the “coercion context” remains implicit in any discus-
sion of substitute decision making. Arguably, at present, the predomi-
nant power structure lies not so much within the clinician–patient
relationship, but within risk-based mental health laws coupled with
inaccurate public perceptions of the dangers of those with mental
illness. The disadvantages of such laws, both for patient rights and for
the clinician–patient relationship, has been well examined elsewhere
(Dawson & Szmukler, 2006). It may well be that shifting more power
towards the clinician–patient relationship, removed from social percep-
tions of risk, could in fact serve to protect patients from more malign
power structures in relation to writing SBDs. At present, patients are
subject to ever present risk of repeated compulsory treatment in which
SBDs cannot play a role. For these reasons we, like Widdershoven and
Berghmans (2001), consider that the writing of an SBD needs to be a
collaborative process between clinician and patient, whichmake speciﬁc
and mutually acceptable recommendations based on past experience of
treatment.
An alternative possibility of creating a formal role for a carer or nom-
inated non-clinical advocate in drafting an SBDand sanctioning enforce-
ment seems problematic. Undue pressure from relatives and partners
themselves is often cited as a concern surrounding SBDs (Varekamp,
2004) and, unlike clinicians, carers, or legal advocates, can lack clinical
understanding and are removed from systems of treatment delivery
and clinical governance. Finally, there is also the danger that in the
course of a manic episode, where the proxy themselves may be the
object of patient's manic thinking and feeling, such a role could put
unfair, or extreme, pressure on relationships serving a non-coercive
function (Atkinson et al., 2004).
Even though patients may recognise that SBDs bring a risk of
undue inﬂuence within the clinician–patient relationship, they can
still view the lack of an SBD provision as restrictive and damaging,
as was the case in the Netherlands and is reﬂected in the desires
expressed by P. Creating safeguards would be a difﬁcult balance
between ensuring both protection, but also that such protection
does not stiﬂe the practicability of creating SBDs. It would seem
unjustiﬁed to reject tout court a potentially valuable intervention
due to fears of abuse of power within the clinician–patient or other
relationships (Sheetz, 2006). Such risks can never be entirely
avoided. However, this should not stand in the way of seeing the
increased level of choice and freedom an SBD might bring to an
individual's life, by giving them the freedom to plan for the future,
knowing that they have taken steps to insure themselves against
the repeated devastation their episodes of mania can bring.
97T. Gergel, G.S. Owen / International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 40 (2015) 92–101
4.1.2. Enforcing the SBD
Once an SBD is drafted, there are a number of major concerns that
can be raised surrounding enforcement. First, even though we consider
loss of DMC-T as a necessary condition for enforcement of an SBD,
concerns may still remain about the objectivity of DMC-T assessment.
Next, there are concerns about the justiﬁcations for use of compulsory
treatment: can the harms of mania ever be sufﬁcient to justify compul-
sory treatment and are there sufﬁcient moral grounds for the person
with bipolar, when well, to exercise precedent autonomy over them-
selves, when manic (Sarin, 2012; Van Willigenburg & Delaere, 2005)?
Before addressing these questions, let us ﬁrst hear from P himself, in
his non-manic state, reﬂecting on his experience when manic: “what
you've been doing was chaotic and uncontrollable”; “when you're
high, you're not in control of your faculties fully…you don't make the
right decisions”; “your decision-making becomes erratic, whereas
when you're normal you wouldn't put yourself in them type of
jeopardies”; “you cross the bridge in your mind. You cross the bridge
where you're no longer rational”.
On the objectivity of DMC-T assessment, ﬁrst and foremost comes
our suggestion that DMC-T should be informed by the individual's
SBD, with its detailed and speciﬁc indicators of loss of DMC-T, based
on approved clinician–patient analysis of case history (Gevers, 2002).7
In more general terms, research into DMC-T in mania is in its infancy
and the concept itself is complex, due to its crossover between psychia-
try, law and ethics. Even so, when judgements of DMC-T are structured
in settings where mania is common, interrater reliability is very good
(Cairns et al., 2005b). Further development of tools for DMC-T assess-
ment speciﬁcally tailored to mania and its preceding and subsequent
states (“hypomania”) would help to reﬁne understanding of DMC-T
and be useful for creating effective SBDs.
Despite continuing debate, public policy, as reﬂected in mental
health laws, accepts the use of compulsory treatment in all liberal dem-
ocratic societies of which we are aware. Is this then justiﬁed in the case
ofmania? The harms ofmania are real, well documented, and have been
directly experienced by those who are considering an SBD. P, for exam-
ple, judges the self-inﬂicted damage to himself when manic as a direct
consequence of the mental disorder he himself is unable to control.
Moreover, a precondition for drafting an SBD must be a judgement
agreed by both patient and the clinician that harms consequent to the
mania justify compulsory treatment. Thus, the appraisal of harms is
person-centred, rather than external, and compulsory treatment is
effectively self-sanctioned. In such a context, objections to compulsory
treatment for mania risk denying a sufferer, who has both DMC-T and
personal experience of mania, the authority to know what represents
their own interests with regard to compulsory treatment. Such objec-
tions, based as they are on the prioritisation and protection of individual
autonomy within mental healthcare now appear self-contradictory and
ethically untenable.
Are there moral grounds for appealing to precedent autonomy
within bipolarity? Does the autonomy of P when well trump the will
and preferences of P when manic (Dresser, 1982; Sarin, 2012; Sheetz,
2006; Van Willigenburg & Delaere, 2005)? If we respect the person by
respecting the person's will and preferences then how can we respect
both the person at time 1 (when well and wanting to write a SBD)
and at time 2 (when manic and refusing treatment)? These questions
are philosophically complex but we may start to see a way through
them by looking again at P's predicament.
Precedent autonomy, as reﬂected in an advance directive, relies upon
a combination of continuity and discontinuity of personhood, together
with a loss of DMC-T at the time when the directive is invoked. As
reﬂected in his metaphor of the bridge between irrationality and ‘nor-
mality’, P views his manic self as fundamentally different from his well
self in terms of his values and beliefs such as responsibility towards his
family, regard for his own safety and property and religious views.
This change is not a complete transformation of personhood. Even
when manic, P continues to recognise himself as P and have a memory
of his life, including previousmanic episodes. Yet he lacks his usual inhi-
bitions, gives away all his possessions and enters into situations which
he would ordinarily recognise as enormously risky. Moreover, with
ﬂuctuating capacity change is not irreversible and directives present
views both before and after loss of capacity, meaning that concerns
over permanent change of personhood, which feature in debates on
advance directive for irreversible illness contexts have minimal bearing
here (Buchanan & Brock, 1989; Davis, 2002).
P himself talks about his absence of DMC-T when manic. He sees his
manic self as uncontrollable and not subject to any internal conﬂict or
inhibitions which might prevent him from acting on the basis of his
‘well’ values and beliefs. Discussions of SBDs often draw on themislead-
ing parallels taken from discussions of precommitment as a means to
control ‘weakness of will’ or akrasia, such as Christmas savings accounts
which impose penalties on anunrestrained spender for earlywithdraw-
al or Elster's well-known example of the lecherous academic, who takes
his wife to a faculty party, so that he will be discouraged from toomuch
drink or ﬂirtation (Elster, 2000, p. 11). Not only do such examples
misrepresent the impact of mania, they depend upon the presence of
synchronic conﬂicting desires and the possibility of rational contempla-
tion and dissuasion.8 Yet the notion of mania invoked within an SBD is
more akin to the overwhelming bewitchment of the Sirens, which
leaves its listener utterly powerless to resist being lured towards
destruction or to recollect their ordinary values and priorities in a way
which could function as some type of rational disincentive.
Akrasia also implies some intrinsic weakness of character. By con-
trast, an SBD relies on the notion thatmanic urges result from a disorder
extrinsic to the values, behavioural patterns and beliefs constitutive of
the patient's true self. SBDs are therefore predicated on a diachronic no-
tion of personhood, with which one's true or ‘normal’ self depends on
some degree of consistency, or recognisability, over time, and which
can be interrupted by themajor changes in values and beliefs accompa-
nying mania. Such a model is closer to Davis' suggestions for SBDs, in
which the fact that non-manic wishes are diachronically dominant
justiﬁes the applicability of precedent autonomy to mania (2008)9. It
should not be taken, however, to imply a strong notion of teleology or
narrative.10
It is also important to differentiate between what we might term
“subjective” and “objective” personhood. By subjective personhood we
refer to the self as constituted by psychological continuity of values
and beliefs, usually referred to as ‘personal identity’within philosophy.
It is this subjective personhood to which we refer as both dependent
upon diachronic consistency or recognisability and which can be com-
promised or interrupted in certain respects at certain times. By contrast,
with objective personhood wemean a third-person view of “person” as
legal individual, entitled to human rights. While self-determination or
personal autonomy is essential to subjective personhood, objective
personhood does not depend upon self-determination, temporary or
ﬂuctuating loss of capacity, whether through mania, other forms of
mental disorder, drunkenness or physical illness. Objective personhood
remains uncompromised by these perennial human phenomena, ensur-
ing that, even when subjective personhood is compromised and DMC-T
7 Washington and Pennsylvania have allowed an individual to designate indicators of
loss of DMC-T on an advance directive (Sheetz, 2006, p. 417).
8 As Aristotle says ‘the akratic acts on account of passion, even though he knows it is
wrong’ (NE 1145b13). VanWilligenburg and Delaere draw on Elster's inclusion of mental
disorder amongst instances of akrasia, and class ‘manic psychosis’ amongst instances
where ‘passions distort and cloud human reason’ and ‘we sometimes act against our
own better reason’ (Van Willigenburg & Delaere, 2005, pp. 397–402).
9 However, Davis sees this as a means to justify the overruling of the patient's compe-
tent wishes at this point, rather than suggesting that the inconsistencies between current
and diachronic values and beliefs might suggest that competence is in doubt.
10 While an SBD may seemmost appealing to those with a more goal-directed or narra-
tive sense of self, it would be perfectly possible for an individual's personhood to reﬂect
diachronic consistency of values and beliefs in the very changeability of their sense of self.
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lost, the individual consequently subjected to the enforcement of an
SBD is entitled to protection of their human rights and respect for
their ﬁrst-person experiences as being essentially human.
SBDs rely on these dual notions. Assessment using an SBD would be
able to build a picture of whether an individual's values and beliefs are
indicative of illness and loss of DMC-T, using evidence drawn from
their history and from their very own capacitous appraisal of their
values and beliefs and how the current behaviours represent, on
balance, a major and self-inconsistent shift which puts them at risk.
Misleading suggestions of capacity, which might arise through the syn-
chronic consistency of values, beliefs and behaviour, which can occur,
especially during the early stages of mania, may be doubted through
their diachronic inconsistency or non-recognisability (Banner &
Szmukler, 2013).
This subjective/objective personhood distinction also takes us some
way towards addressing challenges stemming from the CRPD's notion
of universal legal capacity and the delinking of legal andmental capacity
(Richardson, 2012). SBDs seek to protect an individual's subjective sense
of personhood and maximise self-determination, through providing
them with a means to control their own actions when they lack DMC-
T, without compromising legal capacity and entitlement to human
rights. Objective legal personhood should accommodate a person's
right to view their own subjective personhood as compromised or
interrupted at points and their requests for others' assistance in exerting
self-directed control over themselves at these times.
4.1.3. Clinical questions
Surveys of mental health clinicians' views on advanced refusals,
instructional directives and health proxies reveal a mixed picture;
confusion about the law is common, as are concerns about resources
or detrimental use of advance refusals (Atkinson et al., 2004; Elbogen
et al., 2006; Kim et al., 2008; Van Dorn et al., 2006)11. One recent trial
of a form of instructional directive (crisis cards for patient with psycho-
sis involving an independent facilitator) reported that clinical resistance
during the trial was signiﬁcant (Thornicroft et al., 2013), whereas a
small study of Dutch psychiatrists reported only 2 out of 17 were abso-
lutely opposed to SBDs and many had positive views — especially in
disorders with a cyclical pattern (Varekamp, 2004). One qualitative
study conducted when the Dutch SBD laws were introduced reported
this interesting reaction from a psychiatrist, which highlights how an
SBD can, in itself, bring positive changes to the structure and process
of the clinical relationship:
“initially I thought [an SBD arrangement] primarily had a juridical,
contractual tone… [I was] surprised that something quite different
was set in motion… It [the something quite different that was set
inmotion]may not be primarily what a [SBD arrangement] is meant
for but it is a deﬁnition of the treatment relationship in terms of
mutual obligations (Gremmen, 2008).”
Very little is known about clinical views on SBDs in Bipolar Affective
Disorder. This needs further investigation, given that the effectiveness of
SBDswould,we argue, depend upon their integration into the clinician–
patient relationship to work. We now brieﬂy consider and respond to
some concerns clinicians might have about SBDs in Bipolar Affective
Disorder.
The lack of time and resources is a signiﬁcant obstacle. Drafting an
SBDwould be fairly labour intensive and, at a timewhen mental health
services often feel stretched beyond capacity, making space for incorpo-
rating yet another set of processes and regulations might be considered
impracticable in some service settings. The CRIMSON study, for exam-
ple, found that many teams did not set aside speciﬁc dedicated time
for working on the PADS or that, if they did, not all relevant team mem-
bers were present (Thornicroft et al., 2013). The fact that Dutch SBDs are
considered to be ‘a time-consuming and complex endeavour’ has been
identiﬁed as a probable contributory factor to their poor take-up
(Berghmans & van der Zanden, 2012). Moreover, an effective SBD
would require clinical analysis of the illness trajectory within the broader
context of the patient's life. This would need to take place during remis-
sion, whenminimal time is often allocated for clinical involvement, espe-
cially from doctors, and it would also require a continuity of care often
unavailable.
SBDs change the conventional nature of the clinical relationship,
allowing not only more space for communication, but creating a more
shared process of decision-making, which allocates more control and
responsibility to a patient in remission. These changes frequently cited
amongst the most signiﬁcant potential beneﬁts of PADs would also
allow the clinical team greater opportunity to distinguish a patients'
underlying personality from their behaviours when ill. Nevertheless,
these changes might also provoke some degree of anxiety and uncer-
tainty. In practical terms, clinicians may worry about the rectitude of
endorsing this policy, if their services cannot provide the time and
resources necessary for the level of continuity of carewhich the drafting
and implementation of SBDs would require.
There may be further concerns about more subtle psychological
factors. Clinicians may well feel that retrospective analysis of manic
episodes and direct communication about compulsory treatment may
be not only time-consuming, but also an uncomfortable process
for both patient and clinician. Psychological responses such as denial,
projection and avoidance are common coping mechanisms used by
patients to deal with experiences which they may ﬁnd emotionally
overwhelming or very threatening to self-esteem. Although clinicians
may, as we have already discussed, overestimate the psychological
vulnerability of their patients, the type of analysis required for an SBD
could be unsettling and it is important that matters of practice are
handled with sensitivity. It is important to recognise that SBDs are not
an appropriate universal policy to be urged on all those who have expe-
rienced manic episodes and that identifying the appropriate time to
consider drafting an SBD is critical. We suggest that the impetus for an
SBD should come predominantly from the patient, with a clinician
able to listen to and supportively guide the patient as the impetus
forms. There is also the risk that comorbidity between bipolar disorder
and addictions or personality disorders may lead to dysfunctional moti-
vations for drafting SBDs. However, if SBDs must be subject to clinical
recommendation and approval, as we suggest, it will be part of the
duty of care of the expert clinician to recognise such potential problems.
While all these concerns are legitimate, they may become a self-
fulﬁlling prophecy, if they are left unchallenged, and if mental health
stakeholders do not make a strong case for the necessity of continuity
of care and allocation of adequate time and resources. Moreover, clini-
cians discomfort in discussing topics such as compulsory treatment or
previous manic episodes should not be allowed to take priority over
the needs and best interests of their patients. As P makes clear he
wants to talk about these topics because he recognises their future
impact and cares about his future.12
Finally, there are questions of legislation and enforcement. The
current legal status of PADs in general seems to be an instance of an
“incompletely theorized agreement”, an “agreement maintained by
avoiding the question of enforceability”, so that, despite broad agree-
ment as to their usefulness and development in practice and policy,
there is no satisfactory legal framework (Weller, 2013, p. 143). Clini-
cians might be tempted to keep the SBD process informal to avoid the
legal burden, relying on good communication between patient and
team. However, given that SBDs would involve compulsory treatment
11 Anxiety can be sparked by cases such asHargrave v Vermont 340F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 2003),
where Hargrave launched a successful appeal against the Vermont laws utilised in an at-
tempt to overturn her LPA type PAD refusing all psychiatric treatment.
12 It is interesting to note that a Bipolar Service at the Massachusets General Hospital
builds anticipatory decision-making into the clinician–patient relationship (ref http://
www.medscape.org/viewarticle/571159).
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within an innovative framework of anticipatory decision-making, it
seems that, in order to safeguard both patient rights, there is a need
for SBDs to be codiﬁed within law. Moreover, the lack of enforcement
is a major concern voiced in relation to SBDs (Varekamp, 2004), so that
codiﬁcation could also include provision for safeguarding the rights to
appeal against clinical decisions not to follow its recommendations and
for protecting clinicians' SBD-based decisions to overrule their patients'
wishes when ill (Sheetz, 2006). Even so, given the Dutch experience of
over juridiﬁcation, it seems imperative to keep the SBD as intuitive for
clinician and patient as possible and to integrate it, as far as is possible,
within existing structures of mental health law and practice.
5. Conclusion
Our aim in this article has been to explore the issues surrounding
SBDs in bipolar and give preliminary outlines for a model which might
be both feasible within a clinical and legal context and ethically coher-
ent. We have argued for a DMC-T based SBD and for the importance of
keeping SBDs nested within the clinician–patient relationship.
Mental health care is currently in a process of change. While
resources are limited, human rights law and other support for equality
in mental health means that notions such as self-determination and
decision-making capacity are gaining increasing importance in deter-
mining policy and practice. As this happens, it is also becoming clear
that use of these concepts has often lacked nuance, provoking concerns
over whether too much emphasis on self-determination might in itself
be detrimental in a psychiatric context (Lepping & Raveesh, 2014). It
is time, then, to reﬁne our understanding of decision-making capacity
in speciﬁc conditions like bipolar and to bring this together with a
broader understanding of self-determination, able to negotiate the
challenges of advance decision making.
SBDs for people with bipolar constitute a treatment request which
implicates a clinician's duty of care.13 Greater understanding of what
are perceived to be the major obstacles, beneﬁts and ideal modes of
SBD implementation from both a clinical and a patient perspective is
therefore required. Furthermore, given that avoidance of undue com-
plexity in codiﬁcation seems so crucial to the success of introducing
and implementing SBDs, there is a need for legal research into how
best to achieve this within different jurisdictions. There is a delicate
balance to be maintained between safeguarding, practicability and
respecting the patients' own voice.
As we proposed at the outset, this can never be an ideal situation.
Those who live with conditions such asmania are faced with the dilem-
ma of managing a condition which can cause them, on repeated occa-
sions, to act in a way utterly uncharacteristic and destructive of the
things which they valuemost. In what could be considered the ultimate
statement of self-determination, patients like P have acknowledged that
they cannot protect themselves from themselves and need external
constraint. Like Odysseus, who recognises that he will ﬁnd the ropes
which prevent him succumbing to the Sirens as argaleos (‘galling’, ‘pain-
ful’, ‘violent’, ‘shocking’ or ‘difﬁcult’), P knows, from repeated personal
experience, how painful it will be for him to be treated compulsorily.
Yet, he himself feels this would be the best possibility for shielding him-
self and his family fromdamage and regaining control over his life. For P,
as for so many others throughout the history of this debate, an SBDmay
well seem the most obvious and compelling way of managing his
difﬁculties.
As Rosenson and Kasten so eloquently argued in 1992, in support of
introducing SBDs:
Those individuals struggling with mental illness are heroes commit-
ted to their own odyssey. If some can put a protective mechanism in
place tomake the journey less arduous for themselves, and pave the
way for others, rights advocates may come to respect the patient's
right to plan and indeed encourage it (1991).
The history of SBDs has been one of support repeatedly stiﬂed by
concerns. Even when the Netherlands ﬁnally allowed formal codiﬁca-
tion of SBDs, they have been enmeshed in somany protective measures
that they have become almost untenable. Despite the difﬁculties posed
by SBDs, it is time to move forward. Individuals such as P deserve the
right tomake their own decisions aboutwhat is truly in their best inter-
ests. Yet, with savage irony, it seems that society's desire to protect P
may be themain obstacle standing in theway of allowinghim to protect
himself.
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